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Introduction
One of the oldest debates in monetary econom-
ics concerns the appropriate target for mone-
tary policy. Two distinct camps emerge from
this debate—those who favor interest rate tar-
gets and those who favor money growth tar-
gets. Poole (1970) first addressed this question
in an aggregate demand framework of the IS-
LM type. He showed that an interest rate rule is
preferable if money demand shocks are more
numerous than IS shocks, while a money
growth rule is preferable in the opposite case.
Yet, to obtain this answer Poole assumed that
the monetary authorities would choose the
money supply rule that minimized the variabil-
ity of output. This assumption, however, begs
the question of whether such stabilization is
indeed optimal.
This article revisits Poole’s original question.
It argues that there are clear benefits to interest
rate targeting, independent of what types of
shocks hit the economy. Furthermore, these
benefits arise even though money growth must
be procyclical in order to keep interest rates
constant, which increases the variability of out-
put. The reason a constant interest rate will be
optimal is that interest rates act like a tax on
labor, and constant taxes are preferable to vari-
able taxes. This is true whether the alternative
to an interest rate target is a constant money
growth rule or some general money growth
specification. However, this paper places spe-
cial emphasis on analyzing Poole’s original
question—the optimality of money growth
versus interest rate rules.
We use both a partial equilibrium model and
a monetary general equilibrium model with
sluggish portfolio adjustments to analyze the
benefits of interest rate targets. The general
equilibrium analysis shows that an interest rate
target will undo the distortion caused by slug-
gish portfolios. This occurs because, to keep
interest rates constant, the monetary authority
will supply the reserves that would have been
supplied by households in a frictionless envi-
ronment. Even if private savings cannot respond
to current economic conditions, an interest rate
target will enable output and employment to
respond to them efficiently. Which rule will a
benevolent central banker prefer—a constant
money growth rate or an interest rate peg?
Unlike Poole’s analysis, which suggests that the
optimality of an interest rate rule depends on
the source of the shock affecting the economy,
this paper concludes that an interest rate peg
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will be the benevolent central banker’s choice,
whatever one’s view about the types of shocks
most likely to buffet the economy.
We proceed as follows: Section I sets out a
partial equilibrium model of the labor market in
order to discuss the benefits of an interest rate
peg, and section II does the same for the credit
market. Section III integrates these partial equi-
librium analyses into a general equilibrium
framework. Section IV discusses how the econ-
omy will behave with both interest rate targets
and money growth targets. It demonstrates that
if the economy is buffeted by supply shocks,
interest rate rules will dominate any other policy
rule. Section V extends this analysis by assum-
ing that the economy is subject to demand
shocks. Section VI discusses further possible
extensions, and section VII concludes.
I. A Partial
Equilibrium Analysis
of the Labor Market
This section develops the partial equilibrium
analogue of the general equilibrium economy
contained in the third section. We investigate a
model economy where money is introduced by
imposing a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on
market transactions, so that consumers must
hold cash in order to purchase consumption
goods. We also assume a CIA constraint on the
part of firms, which must hold cash in order to
pay their workers. This assumption seems rea-
sonable because there is a lag between the time
when workers are paid and when a firm re-
ceives payment for its product. This means that
firms cannot use cash from sales of their prod-
uct to pay their workers, but must borrow funds
in order to obtain the necessary cash. Sales
receipts are then used to repay these loans.
This friction leads to a key distortion in the
economy. Since firms must borrow money to
pay their wage bill, the nominal interest rate
(and hence inflation) acts like a tax on a firm’s
ability to hire workers. For example, assume
that the demand for labor is perfectly elastic,
that is, the marginal productivity of labor is
constant at the pre-tax market wage, Z. Thus, 
L hours of work translates into Z *L units of
output, where Z can be thought of as a pro-
ductivity shock term that is assumed to be ran-
dom over time. A firm that needs cash to pay
its workers can borrow Z *L/R dollars (where 
R > 1 is the gross nominal rate of interest) in
order to generate Z *L units of output after pay-
ing off its loan. Defining (1–t) = 1/R, we see
that a nominal interest rate of R translates into
a wage tax of t = 1 – 1/R.
What are the benefits of a constant interest
rate? Such a rate implies that the resulting wage
tax, t, will be constant over time. A constant
money growth rule, by contrast, may imply a
fluctuating interest rate, and hence a fluctuating
wage tax. To understand the conditions under
which a constant interest rate—that is, a con-
stant wage tax—is preferred, see figure 1,
which plots the supply and demand for labor.1
Labor supply is standard and is assumed to
have a constant elasticity of h. The deadweight
loss associated with the CIA constraint is given
in figure 1 by triangle D. The average distortion
from the inflation (wage) tax is approximately2
(1)
A constant tax rate is usually preferred to a
variable tax rate over time.3  Since positive
nominal interest rates act like a wage tax, this
suggests that constant interest rates will prove
superior to a policy that allows interest rates to
FIGURE 1




n 1 It may seem peculiar to look at the inflation-tax distortion in the
labor market rather than the money market, but it can be measured in
either. However, one cannot count the distortion in both markets, because
to do so would be double counting.
n 2 By definition,   DL = h
Dw
w      and Lt = httLt.  
Therefore, D »
1
2 DLtt Z =
1
2 Lt Z(tt )2.
n 3 See Sandmo (1974) and Barro (1979, footnote 7).
D = 1
2hE [ZtLt (tt )2].
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vary. Why one might suspect that constant tax
rates and interest rates are preferable to variable
ones is apparent in figure 1 and equation (1).
The distortion from a tax is triangle D in figure
1 and is thus proportional to the square of the
tax. Therefore, a tax that stays at 15 percent
over time will usually be better than one that
fluctuates from zero to 30 percent. With a con-
stant 15 percent tax, the associated loss is pro-
portional to 15 squared, or 225; however, the
loss with a tax that is either zero or 30 percent
is proportional to either zero (zero squared) or
900 (30 squared). If both of these are equally
likely, the average loss associated with a time-




of the Credit Market
Although intuitive, this partial equilibrium
analysis is incomplete. It ignores the general
equilibrium effects that the labor market has on
other markets—and vice versa. For example,
the distortion in the labor market spills over
into the credit market because a higher interest
rate lowers a firm’s demand for labor, which in
turn decreases the firm’s demand for loans.
Thus, these two markets become intimately
linked. The general equilibrium section shows
that this link is crucial if we are to understand
the costs and benefits of interest rate rules.
Before developing this general equilibrium
model, it is useful to discuss the market for
loans, because it is so closely connected with
the labor market. Besides the wage-tax distor-
tion caused by the CIA constraint, another
important friction in the economy is that house-
holds can adjust their consumption and savings
decisions only sluggishly in response to new
conditions. This is the so-called “sluggish port-
folio adjustment” or “limited participation”
assumption, first proposed by Lucas (1990) and
further analyzed by Fuerst (1992).4  This friction
affects the loan market directly, but, as we will
show, it also spills over into the labor market.
We employ this assumption because it pre-
dicts that monetary surprises will increase out-
put and lower nominal interest rates.5  Both of
these predictions are crucial to understanding
how the Federal Reserve operates. For exam-
ple, if the Fed wishes to lower interest rates
and stimulate economic activity, it increases
money growth. Despite the nearly universal
agreement that faster money growth lowers
nominal interest rates in the short term, very
few economic models generate this prediction.6
However, models with sluggish portfolio
adjustments (households’ inability to immedi-
ately adjust their consumption and savings
decisions to shocks) can cause a liquidity
effect. In these models, the key assumption is
that households adjust their portfolios more
slowly than firms do. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1996) present evidence that there is
a liquidity effect and that households do indeed
adjust their portfolios more slowly than firms.
By plotting the supply and demand for loans
(equilibrium in the credit market), figure 2 helps
illustrate why sluggish portfolios may produce
a liquidity effect. The demand for loans slopes
downward, meaning that as interest rates de-
crease, the quantity demand for loans increases.
This occurs because a rise in the nominal inter-
est rate is equivalent to an increase in the wage
tax; its result is less employment and thus a re-
duction in the demand for loans. However, the
supply of loans is perfectly inelastic because
sluggish portfolio adjustments imply that the
FIGURE 2






n 4 For an eminently readable paper that provides a detailed discus-
sion of this economy, see Christiano (1991).
n 5 The ability of surprise monetary injections to lower nominal inter-
est rates is called the liquidity effect. For empirical evidence of a liquidity
effect, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996).
n 6 Even dynamic optimizing versions of sticky-price models cannot
generate the liquidity effect. While real interest rates may decrease with
monetary expansions, this decline is not large enough to undo the increase
in the expected inflation component of the nominal interest rate.
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supply of credit (savings by households) is
predetermined. That is, households cannot
adjust their savings decisions in response to
changes in either money growth (interest rates)
or productivity.
When the Fed increases the money supply,
it injects reserves into the financial system,
thereby shifting the supply of loans outward.
With sluggish portfolios, this results in lower
interest rates, which in turn induce firms to
expand employment and boost output. 7  If
portfolios were not sluggish, this increase
would be completely offset because house-
holds would save less, thereby shifting the sup-
ply of loans inward.
To understand the distortion caused by slug-
gish portfolios, consider the effects of a positive
productivity shock. A productivity increase (in
figure 1, an increase in  Z) induces firms to hire
more workers. The greater demand for workers
in turn shifts out the demand for loans in figure
2. In an economy without portfolio rigidities,
households respond to a productivity shock by
saving more. Their extra savings increase the
cash that intermediaries have on hand to loan
out to firms, thereby shifting out the supply of
credit (loans) as well.
However, when savings behavior is sluggish,
the supply of credit does not increase. It can do
so only if the monetary authority steps in and
supplies extra reserves, which by assumption
would not be forthcoming if money growth
were constant. The effective supply curve with
an interest rate peg is therefore perfectly elastic
(horizontal) at R. With constant money growth,
however, the supply curve is completely inelas-
tic, so that interest rates must increase substan-
tially with productivity shocks in order to clear
the loan market. With sluggish portfolios, keep-
ing money growth constant is especially costly,
because it implies that interest rates must be
quite variable in order to clear the loan market. 
With an interest rate peg, the credit for loans
to firms is supplied by the monetary authority
rather than by the private sector. That is, in
order to keep interest rates from rising, the
monetary authority supplies reserves to the
banking sector, enabling firms to borrow more
and thereby increase their employment. This
allows the economy to respond more efficiently
and quickly to potential economywide shocks,
like productivity shocks. Analogous to revenues
and losses in the labor market, the same vari-
ables can be measured in the loan market in-
stead. One can calculate the deadweight loss
from the CIA constraint in either the labor mar-
ket or the loan market, but not in both.
The next section combines the major features
of the partial equilibrium models discussed
above into a general equilibrium model where
firms must borrow cash to pay their workers,
and households can adjust their savings deci-
sions only sluggishly. The first of these distor-
tions, which arises from the firm’s CIA con-
straint, implies that if the nominal interest rate is
positive, there will be too little labor supplied
(or, equivalently, too little savings or loans
demanded) in equilibrium. The second distor-
tion results from the sluggish portfolio assump-
tion, which implies that interest rates will vary
too much and that this variability is bad pre-
cisely because the interest rate is acting like a
wage tax (or a tax on the demand for loans). 
We show that the benefit of an interest rate
peg is that it essentially eliminates the distortion
caused by sluggish portfolios. The real sides of
two economies—one with portfolio rigidities
and an interest rate peg, the other with an
interest rate peg and instantaneous portfolio
adjustments—will be identical. However, there
will also be a cost associated with pegging
interest rates. Because of the precautionary
demand for savings, variability in interest rates
will tend to increase savings. This increase
spills over into the labor market, mitigating the
distortion caused by the CIA constraint. Despite
these costs and benefits, we show that a con-
stant interest rate will still be preferable to a
policy that allows interest rates to vary.
III. The General
Equilibrium Analysis
The model economy consists of four different
types of agents: households, firms, financial in-
termediaries, and the government. At the begin-
ning of each period, all money in the economy
is in the hands of households, which accumu-
lated it in the previous period from labor, divi-
dend, and interest earnings. Households decide
how much of this money they wish to save
(loan to the financial intermediary) for future
consumption, and how much they wish to pay
to firms in order to consume today. We assume
that households must hold money in order to
purchase consumption goods.
As discussed earlier, portfolio adjustments
are assumed to take time. The simplest way of
n 7 This is a partial equilibrium story, so we have obviously ignored
the roles of price adjustments and expected inflation, which are crucial to
understanding the whole story. Readers interested in the conditions under
which a liquidity effect arises in a general equilibrium model with sluggish
portfolios are encouraged to see Christiano (1991).
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modeling this sluggishness is by positing that
households make consumption and savings
decisions before they identify the various
shocks that buffet the economy. This less-than-
perfect flexibility is meant to reflect that contin-
ually changing one’s behavior with every bit of
new information would be prohibitively costly.
We first consider the case of productivity
shocks (supply shocks). We then examine the
case where there are shocks to government
spending (demand shocks).
After households make their consumption
and savings decisions, the productivity shock,
Z, occurs and is costlessly observed by every-
one.8  Under an interest rate peg, the monetary
authority then injects money into the economy
through the financial intermediary, so that the
productivity shock does not change nominal
interest rates. Therefore, money growth will be
endogenous, responding as necessary to keep
the nominal interest rate from changing. With a
constant money growth regime, there will be a
fixed injection to the financial intermediary,
and interest rates will respond endogenously.
The model’s details are spelled out below.
Since the purpose of this paper is to provide a
simple example of the benefits of an interest
rate peg, we abstract from capital accumulation
and assume particular functional forms for util-
ity and production. In addition, the productivity
shock is assumed to be independently identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) over time. As Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1995) show, none of these abstrac-
tions affects our results.
Households
Preferences are standard in that households
derive utility from consumption,  ct, and disutil-
ity over labor, Lt, to maximize discounted
expected utility subject to the CIA constraint
and the resource constraint: 9 
max E0  S
¥
t = 0bt [ln(ct) – ALs
t ], subject to
(i)
(ii)
The variables Mt, Pt, Ct, Wt, and Lt
s are the
time t money holdings, nominal price level,
consumption, nominal wage, and labor supply
(or hours worked). The first constraint is the
CIA constraint, which says that consumers must
have enough cash on hand to finance consump-
tion expenditures. This cash consists of the
worker’s wage earnings (which are paid in
cash) and the fraction of period t money hold-
ings left after the saving partner visits the finan-
cial intermediary to deposit Nt dollars.
The second constraint states that the cash
sources the household carries into t + 1 include
interest on savings, dividends that the house-
hold receives from the firm Ft, and dividends it
receives from the intermediary Dt. Since the
household is an atomistic part of the economy,
dividend payments are outside its control and
are equivalent to lump-sum payments. Finan-
cial intermediaries’ profits arise because of the
monetary injection they receive. Firms’ profits
arise because a worker’s average productivity is
greater than his marginal productivity. The sum
in parentheses is the cash that is not spent
when the consumption market closes. In equi-
librium, this will be zero.
Firms
The economy consists of one representative
firm owned by a representative household. The
firm produces one consumption good accord-
ing to the production function
(2)
The variable Lt
D  is labor demand at time t,
while Zt is the productivity shock, which we
assume to be i.i.d. over time. The unusual
aspect of this production function is K, which
measures the contribution of capital to produc-
tion and is assumed to be fixed. We have fixed
capital entering additively in the production
function because we wish to capture the
observed phenomenon that labor increases
with positive productivity shocks.10  This fea-
ture arises in more complicated models with
capital accumulation, where capital affects the
marginal productivity of labor.
n 8 The modeling fiction used is that households consist of a
“worker–shopper” and a “saver” to conduct financial transactions. The
assumption of sluggish portfolios implies either that the saver does not
observe the shock contemporaneously, or that he leaves for the bank
before Z is realized. After Z is realized, the worker–shopper leaves for work
and then purchases consumption goods on the way home.
n 9 The assumption that the disutility of working is linear in labor
supply is equivalent to assuming that labor supply is indivisible. See
Rogerson (1988) or Hansen (1985) for details.
n 10 Without this assumption, the income and substitution effects of
a productivity shock will cancel one another out, so that labor supply will
be constant in equilibrium. Interest rates will also be constant, with or
without portfolio rigidities.
Mt+   1<R tN t+ Dt + Ft
+ (Mt – Nt +W tLs
t  – PtCt ).
PtCt < Mt – Nt +W tLs
t 
yt =K+Z tL t
D .
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Because firms are also subject to a CIA con-
straint, at the beginning of period  t they bor-
row enough from the financial intermediary to
finance their nominal labor costs, WtLt
D. Every
firm then uses the proceeds from selling its
consumption goods to pay off the labor loan
that it took out when the period began,  RtWtLt
D.
Since the firm is owned by the representative
household, it maximizes 
E5 S
¥
t = 03bt +1 Uc, t + 14Dt6 subject to (2), 
where Dt = Pt yt  – RtWtLt
D .
The term in the square brackets above is a
shareholder’s marginal utility of a dollar re-
ceived at the end of period t. Therefore, a dol-
lar of a dividend received in period t can be
transformed into 1/Pt + 1 units of consumption
in period t + 1, where Uc, t + 1 reflects the house-




There is also a representative but competitive
financial intermediary, owned by the represen-
tative household, that is completely passive in
our analysis. It accepts deposits from house-
holds, Nt, and receives lump-sum transfers
from the government equal to the seigniorage
the government receives from money creation, 
Mt + 1 – Mt, then loans these funds out to firms.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the supply of loans
must equal the demand for loans: 
WtHt = Nt + (Mt+1– Mt). Because governments
distribute their seigniorage to intermediaries,
intermediaries make a profit, which is distrib-
uted to households as a lump-sum payment.11
This dividend payment is given by
(3) Ft = Rt (Mt + 1 – Mt).
The Monetary
Authority
For most of this section, we consider two differ-
ent operating procedures for the monetary
authority. The first is pursuit of an interest rate
target, where reserves are supplied to the bank-
ing sector in such a way that the interest rate in
the economy is constant at R. Note that money
growth, Gt = Mt + 1/Mt , is not constant under this
procedure and responds endogenously to sup-
port the interest rate target. The second operat-
ing procedure that we analyze, money growth,
Gt = G, is constant. In this case, the interest rate
Rt  is not constant and will respond endoge-
nously to productivity shocks.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the labor (4), loan (5), and
goods (6) markets must all clear and the CIA




(5) nt + Gt – 1 = wtLt
D
(6) Yt = K + ZtLt = Ct
(7) ptCt £ 1 – nt + wt Lt, 
where wt = Wt
Mt  
, pt =  P t
Mt 
, and nt =  Nt
Mt   
.12 
Since this model does not include capital,
equation (6) states that the goods market clears
when consumption equals output. Equation (7)
is the household’s CIA constraint which, when
combined with (5), states that, in equilibrium,
tomorrow’s money stock must equal the value
of consumption today.  
Equilibrium also consists of households
maximizing utility13
(8) A =  
wt
ptCt








This last condition says that the equilibrium
real wage rate will equal the marginal produc-
tivity of labor deflated by the gross nominal
n 11 Therefore, revenues from money creation are essentially redis-
tributed to households in a lump-sum manner instead of being used by the
government to help finance deficit spending. This assumption is made for
simplicity and does not affect the results of our analysis.
n 12 As long as nominal interest rates are strictly positive, that is, 
R > 1, (7) will be satisfied with equality. All equations with nominal vari-
ables are divided by the beginning-of-period money supply so that they are
stationary.
n 13 There is actually one more equation that is necessary in equilib-
rium. This is the household’s intertemporal first-order condition, which






). For the sluggish portfolio model,s = t – 1, since
savings nt are chosen at time t – 1. With fixed capital and independent
technology shocks, this implies that savings will be constant, nt = n. With
flexible portfolios s = t, indicating that nt can be chosen conditional on
time t innovations.
Uc, t + 1
Pt + 1
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interest rate; that is, the real wage equals the
after-tax marginal productivity of labor. This
equation also gives the demand curve for labor.
Combining (5), (6), (7), and (9) implies 




where st =      Gt
, Rt = R for an interest
rate peg, and st = s when  money growth rates
are pegged.
The variable st is interpreted as the share of
the money stock held by the intermediary. As
the next equation indicates, this share will
determine equilibrium labor, and thus output,
for the economy. Using (5) and (8) gives the
following expression for labor in equilibrium: 




The disadvantage of letting money growth 
be constant is apparent in (11). With sluggish
portfolios and i.i.d. technology shocks,n is con-
stant (see footnote 7). Therefore, when money
growth rates are pegged, the share of money in
the hands of the intermediary will also be con-
stant, st = s. This implies that with constant
money growth, labor will also be constant.
However, with an interest rate peg, money
growth is endogenous, so that the share of
money held by intermediaries is not constant.
The next section analyzes how money growth






The Benefit of an
Interest Rate Peg
In order to understand how money growth will
behave to support an interest rate peg, com-
bine (6), (10), and (11) to obtain the relation-
ship between the share of cash held by inter-
mediaries, st, and productivity:
(12) st =   .
To keep nominal interest rates constant, 
the share of cash held by financial intermedi-
aries must increase as productivity rises. Then,
from the definition of st, money growth must
also increase with productivity (since nt = n). 
Equation (12), however, will hold regardless
of whether portfolios are rigid. The only differ-
ence between an economy with portfolio rigidi-
ties and one without them is how the increase
in st is achieved. With sluggish portfolios, since
savings n are predetermined, the private sector
cannot supply the credit necessary to make this
occur. Therefore, in order to keep interest rates
constant, the monetary authority must step in
and supply reserves to the banking system,
which lowers the real rate of interest. In appen-
dix 1, we show that with portfolio rigidities,
money growth (Gt









where a, b > 0 and nt
pr = nss.
Without portfolio rigidities, private savings
are not fixed; that is, they can respond to cur-
rent economic conditions. This reverses the role
of private savings versus government credit cre-
ation. When there are no portfolio rigidities
(npr), money growth Gt
npr is constant, while pri-
vate savings respond to productivity increases:
Gt
npr = Gss and nt
npr = c – d
Zt
,
where c, d > 0. The relationship between the
two economies is E(nt
npr) = nss, E(Gt
pr
1 ) = Gss
1 .14
The important variable governing the econ-
omy’s behavior is st, the share of cash held by
financial intermediaries. With an interest rate
peg, this share is the same regardless of wheth-
er portfolios are sluggish. Therefore, from equa-
tion (11) we know that hours worked will also
be the same. Since the share of cash held by in-
termediaries increases with positive productivity
shocks, equilibrium labor will respond quickly
and efficiently to technology shocks whether or
not portfolios are sluggish. The only difference
between the two economies is whether the pri-
vate sector or the government is supplying the
Zt – AKR
Zt R
n 14 With flexible portfolios, there are many possible money growth
rules that support an interest rate peg (see footnote 13). Another rule that
will support an interest rate peg is i.i.d. money growth shocks.
1– R ts t
n t +G t –1
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credit.15  Without portfolio rigidities, a constant
money growth rule can support an interest rate
peg. Households are now supplying the inter-
mediary with the savings that the monetary
authority supplied when portfolios were rigid.
The advantage of an interest rate peg is that
it eliminates the distortion caused by sluggish
portfolios. However, it does not eliminate the
distortion caused by the CIA constraint, which
persists as long as nominal interest rates are
positive. With a constant money growth rule,
both distortions will be present. Despite this,
however, we are in a second-best environment
and cannot conclude that an interest rate peg
will necessarily dominate a constant money
growth rule. The reason is that sometimes two
distortions are preferable to one (for example,
if one distortion mitigated the other). Indeed,
we will show that this occurs to a limited
extent: Variable interest rates increase savings,
partially mitigating the distortion caused by the
CIA constraint.
We do know, however, that the Friedman
rule of setting the nominal interest rate to zero,
R = 1, will be unambiguously better than a
money growth rule or any other rule that
achieves a zero nominal interest rate on aver-
age. This is because all distortions in the econ-
omy are eliminated when the nominal interest






When money growth is constant, equilibrium
will still be characterized by equations (10) and
(11) above. The difference is that in equation
(12), st, the share of cash in the hands of finan-
cial intermediaries, will be constant, while the
nominal interest rate will vary. With constant
money growth and sluggish portfolios, this
share is also constant, since neither money




This equation shows that with constant
money growth, interest rates and technology
shocks covary positively with one another. A
rise in productivity increases loan demand,
which in turn increases interest rates, because
credit is fixed. Equation (11) tells us that interest
rates will increase until equilibrium labor does
not change. Labor’s inability to respond to
technology shocks will prove especially costly.
An equivalent way to look at this cost is through
the sharp interest rate movements required to
ensure that the loan market always clears.
Under an interest rate peg, labor can respond
to productivity changes because money growth
is procyclical. However, for the same reason,
many economists and policymakers believe that
an interest rate peg would be counterproduc-
tive. They reason that if money growth were
procyclical, output (and hence consumption)
would also be more variable. They consider this
undesirable because, holding everything else
constant, consumers prefer a less variable con-
sumption stream. 
Yet everything else is not held constant.
Allowing labor to respond efficiently to produc-
tivity shocks may increase the variability of
consumption, but it also increases average con-
sumption. To see this, assume that the average
distortion is the same for an interest rate peg as
it is for a money growth peg. That is, we as-
sume that 1/R = E(1/Rt) or, equivalently, that
E(st) = s (from equation [12¢]).
From (10) and (12¢), the standard deviation
of consumption when interest rates are pegged
equals
(13) sR = 
AR
.
From the goods-market-clearing condition,
the standard deviation of consumption when
money growth is constant equals
(14) sG =  A
.
Since s < 1/R, it is easy to see that consump-
tion is more variable under an interest rate
peg.16  This occurs because money growth is
allowed to move with output when interest
rates are constant, thus increasing the variability
of both output and consumption. Why is an
interest rate peg beneficial under these circum-
stances? Mean consumption will also be higher





n 15 If all real variables are the same, the real rate of interest will
also be the same. Since nominal interest rates are the same by assump-
tion, the expected rate of inflation is also the same for an economy with
and without portfolio rigidities. Yet with portfolio rigidities, money growth
increases with productivity shocks. However, this increase leads to a one-
time rise in the price level and does not affect “expected” inflation, since
with portfolio rigidities, the expectation is formed prior to realization of the
productivity shock.
n 16 From (12), we know that s = 1/R – AKE(1/Zt). This implies
that s <  1/R .
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From equation (6), the goods-market-clearing
condition, we obtain
(15) EtCt
R – EtC G
t = cov(Lt
R, Zt).
Average consumption is higher under an in-
terest rate peg precisely because labor responds
optimally to technology shocks. Therefore, the
same economic force that increases output’s
variability when interest rates are pegged also
increases average consumption. With constant
money growth, however, labor supply is con-
stant. Variable labor is preferred because it al-
lows workers to truncate the effect of bad
shocks by working less and to accentuate the
effect of good shocks by working more.
Despite increased variability in consumption,
households would gladly trade off this extra
variability for the extra consumption it provides
on average. Using (13) we have
(16) EUR – EU G = ln( 1
R ) – E ln( 1
Rt ) > 0.17
This expression is positive, since utility is
concave and, by assumption, E(1/Rt) = 1/R. Re-
calling that 1/Rt = (1 – tt), this expression is the
general equilibrium equivalent of the result that
a constant tax rate is preferred to a variable one.
To compare an interest rate peg with a con-
stant money growth rule, something must be
held constant across the two regimes. The
analysis above assumes that the average distor-
tion is the same for both economies. An alter-
native variable that could be held constant
across both regimes is the amount of seignior-
age collected under each. Although 1 – 1/R
measures the distortion in the economy, the
effective rate at which taxes are collected is 
1 – 1/G.18  These two differ because, even if
inflation is zero, there still exists the distortion
caused by workers’ inability or unwillingness to
obtain direct payment in real goods after pro-
duction. Therefore, an alternative way to com-
pare constant money growth rates and constant






) =  1
bR
. This is equiva-
lent to setting interest rates in the two econo-
mies to be equal on average. In appendix 2, we
show that for any two policies in which average
seigniorage is the same, a constant interest rate
will be preferred to a variable one.19  As a spe-
cial case, this implies that an interest rate rule is
preferred to a constant money growth rule.
The intuition about the advantages and 
disadvantages of a constant money growth 
rule versus a constant interest rate rule is this:
The cost of a money growth rule is that with
sluggish portfolios, it greatly increases interest
rate variability and thus the variability of the
equivalent wage tax. However, there is also a
benefit to having a constant money growth rate,
that is, letting interest rates be variable: Since
interest rates are the same on average, the
inverses of the interest rates are not the same; in
particular, 1/R > E(1/Rt). Therefore, to obtain
equal revenue, the average distortion is greater
with an interest rate peg. Variable interest rates
help mitigate the distortion caused by the CIA
constraint, because they increase savings. From
equation (12), we derive E(st) > s or nG > nR.
This increase in savings spills over into the labor
market, implying more employment, thus miti-
gating the distortion caused by the CIA con-
straint. Unless this distortion is extremely large
(R > 2), the gains from reducing it are less than
the potential gains from stabilizing interest rates





Up to this point, our analysis has assumed that
all shocks to the economy are productivity
shocks. Poole’s original study suggested that an
interest rate rule is preferred when money de-
mand shocks are more numerous than IS
shocks, while a money growth rule is preferred
when IS shocks are more numerous. The mean-
ing of IS and LM shocks is ambiguous in general
equilibrium models. Nonetheless, one might
expect an interest rate rule to be desirable, be-
cause we assume that all shocks to the econ-
omy are supply shocks.
n 17 Since  E(st) = s, equilibrium labor is the same on average.
Therefore, given the assumption that utility is linear in leisure, we are sim-
ply left with the difference in the utility from consumption, which from (13)
simplifies to (16).
n 18 We define seigniorage for the two policies in terms of how
many labor units the government can hire with the revenue.  This is
because we think of the government as using seigniorage to hire labor in
order to produce a public good.  Therefore, seigniorage (in labor units)
equals (Mt + 1 – Mt)/Wt = (Gt – 1)/(A*pt *Ct )  =  (Gt – 1)/(A*Gt). If gov-
ernment production is not subject to the same high-frequency technology
shocks as the private sector, the average amount of public goods produced
will be the same for any two policies where E(1/Gt)is the same for both
policies. For simplicity, however, the actual model in the text continues to
assume that these revenues are given right back to the households as a
lump-sum transfer. That is, the government robs Peter to pay Peter. 
n 19 Actually, an interest rate target will be preferred only if R < 2.
That is, the nominal interest rate must be less than 100 percent annually.
     1       
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To analyze the effect of demand shocks, we
introduce government spending shocks into
our framework.20  The question now is whether
a benevolent monetary authority should accom-
modate government spending shocks to sup-
port an interest rate peg. The answer is yes.
Government spending that is financed with
lump-sum taxes can be introduced quite sim-
ply by redefining output and consumption as
follows: 
yt = (K + ess) + ZLt
Ct = Kt + ZLt,
where Kt = (K + ess) – et.
The only difference in the definition of con-
sumption is that K is no longer constant but
can vary randomly over time. In particular, we
assume that Kt is i.i.d. over time, which corre-
sponds to the assumption that government
spending shocks are i.i.d. A large value of K is
equivalent to government spending below its
mean (et < ess), while small values of K repre-
sent government spending shocks above its
mean (et > ess).
The first-order conditions are the same as
before, except that in equations (10)–(12), Zt
is assumed to be constantwhile K is allowed 
to vary:
(17)  Ct = 1 – Rtst
,
where st = Gt
, Rt = R for an interest rate
peg, and st = s when money growth rates are
pegged.
(18)  Lt =  
st
A
(19)  Rt = 
sZ +AKt
(money growth rule)
(19¢)   st =  
ZR
(interest rate rule).
With a money growth rule, interest rates
increase to clear the loan market so that equi-
librium labor is constant once again. When
interest rates are pegged, however, labor will
increase with positive government spending
shocks (K is small). This increase is brought
about as the money supply increases in order
to keep the interest rate from rising. An interest
rate peg will still undo the distortion caused by
sluggish portfolio adjustments.
To understand the dynamics of the model, it
is useful to look at the labor market again. The
demand curve for labor, given by equation (9),
is completely elastic at the marginal productiv-
ity of labor deflated by the nominal interest
rate, Z /Rt. Labor supply is obtained by com-
bining (8) and (6). For a money growth peg,
labor supply equals
(20)  L s






A positive shock to government spending
(small K) has the immediate impact of reduc-
ing today’s private consumption relative to
tomorrow’s. As the marginal utility of consump-
tion rises, workers want to increase the number
of hours worked in order to boost their con-
sumption. Thus, labor supply (20) shifts out-
ward. This increases firms’ demand for both
labor and loans. In order to clear the loan mar-
ket, interest rates are driven up, thereby shifting
labor demand (9) down. In equilibrium, the
nominal interest rate increases until the real
wage in (20) declines, so that equilibrium labor
does not change.
Therefore, with a money growth rule, output
(private consumption plus government spend-
ing) is constant, implying that private consump-
tion is crowded out completely. With an inter-
est rate peg, however, money growth increases
in order to prevent the nominal rate from rising
(19¢), thereby allowing both labor and output 
to increase. Combining (2) and (19), private
consumption is constant (Ct =  Z
AR
), so that 
equilibrium output rises by the amount of the
increase in government spending.
If we choose an interest rate target such that
Est = s, it is easy to see that mean consumption
is the same with either operating target. But an
interest rate target is preferred, since private
consumption is less variable (that is, constant).
However, equation (16) will still hold, implying
that an interest rate target will be preferred to
any other rule where 1/R = E(1/Rt). As with
productivity shocks, seigniorage is higher for a
money growth peg if 1/R = E(1/Rt). However,
as appendix 2 makes clear, if 1/G = E(1/Gt), an




Z –A RK t
n 20 In some ways, it is misleading to call government spending
shocks “demand shocks,” since they act like a drain on resources. 
R
nt + Gt – 1
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VI. Extensions
The foregoing analysis illustrates an important
implication of an interest rate target: It com-
pletely eliminates the distortion caused by
households’ inability to readjust portfolio hold-
ings quickly following either technology or
government spending shocks. But there is
nothing special about these shocks. The result
of this analysis would be true for any type of
shock, including preference shocks. For exam-
ple, the same arguments would apply if A or
even b were allowed to vary over time.
We also assume that these shocks are i.i.d.
over time. In an earlier paper (Carlstrom and
Fuerst [1995]), we show that this assumption is
also unnecessary. Under a money growth rule,
consumption and labor will depend on last
period’s shocks and not on today’s innova-
tions. In contrast, an interest rate rule will once
again allow labor and consumption to respond
to today’s information. As before, this option
value will be welfare-improving.
The other assumption used in our model—
that portfolios are rigid for exactly one period
—is also nonessential. Suppose that house-
holds adjust their portfolios slowly because of
convex adjustment costs, as in Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992). Equation (12¢) will still
determine the share of cash held by intermedi-
aries. Therefore, labor and output will also be
the same. The only difference will be how fast
money must grow in response to various
shocks in order to support the interest rate tar-
get. Besides allowing the economy to respond
efficiently to current shocks, the interest rate
rule also has the advantage of enabling house-
holds to avoid the costs associated with adjust-
ing their nominal portfolio holdings.
Yet monetary authorities typically do not
keep interest rates constant over the course of 
a business cycle. One reason often given is that
procyclical money growth may make output
more variable, but it has already been refuted in
this paper: It is efficient to allow the economy
to respond to shocks, although output variabil-
ity increases. A second reason is fear of the
long-run inflationary consequences of an inter-
est rate peg. In the model presented here, long-
term inflation is pinned down by the nominal
interest rate, but short-term inflation can be
quite variable under an interest rate peg. The
long-run inflation rate will be pinned down by
Fisher’s equation. The real federal funds rate has
averaged approximately 2 percent per year
since the beginning of the century; thus, if one
wants inflation to average zero over time, one
should choose a funds rate peg of 2 percent.
Similarly, if one wants inflation to average 3 per-
cent, the nominal interest rate peg should be 5
percent. As for increased short-run inflation vari-
ability, it is far from clear why this is costly.21
According to one argument, there are costs
to changing prices, so stable prices would be
beneficial. If these costs result simply from hav-
ing to reprogram price scanners and change
price tags on products, it is uncertain that prices
will change more frequently with variable infla-
tion, given that inflation is positive. In addition,
similar savings are associated with an interest
rate target, since it has the advantage of allow-
ing households to avoid the costs associated
with adjusting their nominal portfolio holdings.
VII. Conclusions
This paper explores some of the benefits of
interest rate targeting. An interest rate peg is
desirable because such a policy eliminates any
distortion caused by sluggish portfolios. That is,
an interest rate peg allows labor—and thus
output and consumption—to respond opti-
mally to economic shocks. An equivalent way
to think about the benefits of an interest rate
peg is that it minimizes the “inflation tax” dis-
tortion. Nominal interest rates are a tax on non-
interest-bearing assets and mimic the effect of
wage taxes. With sluggish portfolios and con-
stant money growth, interest rates can be quite
variable. Eliminating this variability is welfare-
improving.
Our analysis also suggests that, in order to
achieve an interest rate peg, money growth
should be procyclical. This implies that the vari-
ability of output will also be higher when inter-
est rates are pegged. Despite popular wisdom
to the contrary, this increase in variability is
optimal. With productivity shocks, this is so
because mean consumption is higher. With
government spending shocks, it is so because,
although output is more variable, private con-
sumption is less variable.
n 21 It is obvious why increased inflation uncertainty would be costly.
However, inflation would not be more uncertain, since money growth, and
hence inflation, would respond to publicly observed shocks. If nominal
wage contracts had been made prior to these shocks, this variability would
have real costs.
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With portfolio rigidities, money growth (Gt
pr)
and savings will be of the form
 1
Gt
pr = a + b
Zt 
,
where a, b > 0 and nt
pr = nss .
Given that money growth is of this form,
using the first-order condition for nt (footnote
13), we obtain 
Et – 1 (
1  
Gt + 1) = Et – 1 (a + 
Zt + 1
b ) =  1
bR
.
This expression uses the assumption that
technology shocks are i.i.d. Taking a second-
order approximation, we obtain
(A1)  a + b
Z + b
2sZ
2 =  1
bR
,
where Z and sZ
2 are the mean and variance of
Zt, respectively.
From equation (15), the definition of st, 
and our assumed form for money growth, 
we obtain






Using the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients, we have
a =  
bR [(R – 1) + RAK (1 + sZ
2)]
b =
b[(R – 1) + RAK (1 + sZ
2)]





If portfolios are not fixed, we assume that
money growth and savings have the following
form:
Gt
npr = Gss and nt
npr = c – d
Zt
,
where c, d > 0, E(nt
npr)=n ss, and E(  1 
Gt
pr) =  1
Gss
.
From footnote 13, we obtain





Using the definitions of nt, st, and equation
(12) yields
(A4)   1 + (c – 1)
Gss
–   d 
Gss( 1
Zt) =  1
R
– AK
Zt   
.
Using the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients, we have
c = 1 + b(1 + R )
d = – bRAK
Gss = bR.
Therefore, E(nt
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Appendix 2 
The Desirability 
of an Interest 
Rate Peg
This appendix shows that if seigniorage is on
average equal, interest rate rules will dominate
a money growth rule. Equal revenues imply 
E( 1
Gt
R) =  1
Gss

































We know that consumption is equal to
C R





and labor is Lt = st
A  
.
The difference in utility is therefore
EUR
t – EU G
t = Eln(Rt) – ln(R ) + s – E(st) 
» 1
R




If R < 2, that is, if the nominal interest rate is
less than 100 percent, then an interest rate peg
is preferred to a money growth peg. Actually, a
stronger result holds. Nothing in the proof
assumes that money growth is constant. The
proof compares an interest rate peg to a policy
where the interest rate varies (with average rev-
enues in labor units equal). An interest rate peg
will be preferred to any other policy unless the
distortion caused by the CIA constraint is
extremely large.
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